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LABOR law cases are, to all except the myopic labor lawyer, a subordi- 
nate part of the Supreme Court's work. The Court's primary attention is 
focused on its role in stripping away remnants of racial discrimination 
and segregation,' reconstructing rotted-out state legislatures,2 sensitizing 
law enforcement to the rights of the accused,3 and removing restraints 
on the free market of ideas.4 These are social and political issues of the 
first magnitude, robed in the legal garb of "cases and controversies," and 
brought to the judicial forum for settlement. The Court's decisions 
significantly reshape our institutions, for it often becomes the final 
arbiter directing resolution of these issues. Even if Senator Dirksen's 
amendment5 is adopted, for example, it can never restore the rural 
control of state legislatures. 
By comparison, labor law cases pose relatively simple problems. Al- 
though they raise crucial issues of union-management relations and the 
rights of individuals within this collective structure, the Court has three 
major statutes for guidance-the Norris-LaGuardia Act;6 the National 
Labor Relations Act, twice substantially amended;7 and the Labor 
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.8 The Court's function is 
to follow the will of Congress; its choices are confined by the words of 
the statutes; its decisions are subject to legislative review. And in a 
major segment of these cases the Court has the aid of the National Labor 
Relations Board which serves as an intermediary to evolve and project 
solutions which will fulfill the statutory purpose. Rarely do labor cases 
t Professor of Law, Yale University. 
1. See, for example, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
2. See, for example, Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965); Jordan v. Silver, 381 U.S. 
415 (1965); Hughes v. WMAC, Inc., 379 U.S. 694 (1965). 
3. See, for example, Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 (1964); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 
532 (1965); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1964). 
4. See, for example, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster 
General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
5. S.J. Res. 103, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). 
6. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. ?? 101-15 (1958). 
7. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 
as amended 29 U.S.C. ?? 151-68 (1964). 
8. 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. ?? 401 et seq. (1964). 
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require constitutional determinations-United States v. Brown9 striking 
down as a bill of attainder the rather irrelevant prohibition against 
communists and former communists holding union office is an exception 
-and only occasionally do constitutional overtones give special vi- 
brance to statutory words.'0 These apart, the Court is the servant, not 
the master of legislative will. 
This comparison could give comfort to the labor lawyers and to others 
-if only it were more than half true. But concern with the Supreme 
Court's labor decisions goes beyond the journeyman lawyer's interest in 
advising clients and predicting results. Decisions during the past term 
make plain that the Court's role in this area is not so circumscribed; that 
here, as in other areas, the Court shapes social institutions with little or 
no legislative guidance. 
The Court, during the 1964-65 term, confronted a grab bag of issues 
varying from the right of an individual to sue for breach of a collective 
agreement without first seeking recourse in the grievance procedure" 
to the form of the ballot in representation elections under the Railway 
Labor Act.12 Detailed discussion here, however, is largely limited to its 
disposal of four major problems. The immediate and more prosaic pur- 
poses is to sketch the changes these decisions work in the body of 
substantive law and the impact of those changes on collective bargaining 
structures. The larger purpose is, through these and the other cases, to 
suggest some of the reasons for the Court's commanding role in the law- 
making process, not as ideally conceived, but as realistically practiced. 
THE CONTENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-THE FIBREBOARD CASE 
The most constructive contribution of the Court was its projection in 
the Fibreboard case'3 of a workable standard for determining what 
subjects fall within the reach of mandatory bargaining. The employer, 
near the end of the contract term, announced to the union representing 
a unit of maintenance employees that because of cost considerations it 
had made a definite decision to subcontract all of its maintenance work 
to an independent contractor. The employer bargained with the union 
about termination pay for the employees dismissed, but this was not 
enough. The employer must bargain with the union in advance about 
9. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
10. See, for example, NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 
(1964); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). 
11. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1964). 
12. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of 
Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. 650 (1965). 
13. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
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its decision to subcontract. Because Fibreboard had failed to do so the 
NLRB ordered it to resume the maintenance operation, reinstate the 
employees laid off, and fulfill its statutory obligation to bargain.'4 The 
Court upheld both the Board's determination that the decision to sub- 
contract was a mandatory subject of bargaining, and the Board's 
remedial order requiring cancellation of the subcontract. 
The Court cautiously limits its decision to "the facts of this case."'5 
Although it does not make explicit what facts distinguish this case from 
other subcontracting cases, three elements are strongly emphasized. 
First, this was a subcontracting of work previously performed by 
bargaining unit employees, not the subcontracting of new work or the 
renewal of existing arrangements. It was unilateral action by the em- 
ployer which decreased the number of jobs available. Second, the 
employer's decision to subcontract was an effort to economize on labor 
costs by reducing the number of maintenance employees needed, de- 
creasing the fringe benefits, and eliminating overtime. Third, the work 
continued to be done on the employer's premises in the same general 
manner, but with the subcontractor's employees. This last factor is 
probably less relevant to the employer's duty to bargain than to the 
appropriateness of the remedy imposed by the Board. 
The impact of this decision is not measured by its narrow holding 
that employers are required to bargain with the union before making 
such subcontracts. Far more important is the Court's projection of 
guidelines for determining the boundaries of compulsory bargaining. 
Mr. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, helpfully demonstrates 
the inadequacy of the guides rejected by the Court. His search of the 
legislative history produces nothing more than a vague Congressional 
purpose to limit the subjects of bargaining in some undefined way. He 
is compelled to admit that the statutory words, "terms and conditions of 
employment" provide no workable guide, for they obviously encompass 
discharge, seniority, and compulsory retirement which "concern the 
very existence of employment,'6 but define no line separating other 
management decisions such as introduction of automated equipment, 
change of product, or refinancing which also affect job security. He is 
finally forced to take refuge in intuitive distinctions between "mana- 
gerial decisions which lie at the core of managerial control, . . . which 
are fundamental to the direction of the enterprise,"'7 and those decisions 
14. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enforced 322 F.2d 411 
(D.C. Cir. 1963). 
15. 379 U.S. at 209. 
16. Id. at 222. 
17. Id. at 223. 
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which are "in themselves primarily about conditions of employment."'18 
Searching for something better than this visceral test, the majority 
looked to the underlying purpose of the duty to bargain. Bargaining is 
legally compelled because of the belief that industrial conflict can be 
reduced "by subjecting labor management controversies to the media- 
tory influence of negotiation.'9 From this premise flow two tests. First, 
is the subject of such vital concern to both labor and management that 
it is likely to lead to controversy and industrial conflict? Second, is 
collective bargaining appropriate for resolving such issues? In applying 
these tests the Court does not look inward to its own notion of what is 
of vital concern or what is appropriate for bargaining, but outward to 
industrial experience. Said the Court: 
While not determinative, it is appropriate to look to industrial 
bargaining practices in appraising the propriety of including a 
particular subject within the scope of mandatory bargaining. In- 
dustrial experience is not only reflective of the interests of labor 
and management in the subject matter but is also indicative of the 
amenability of such subjects to the collective bargaining process.20 
Subcontracting is a mandatory subject of bargaining because, "Ex- 
perience illustrates that contracting out in one form or another has been 
brought, widely and successfully within the collective bargaining frame- 
work."2' 
The implications of this approach reach far beyond the problem of 
subcontracting, for it reads the words and purposes of the statute to fit 
an evolving system of collective bargaining. The legal duty to bargain is 
not frozen in legislative moulds cast for 1947 practices, but is constantly 
reshaped by changing practices. As substantial numbers of unions and 
employers voluntarily bring new subjects within the framework of 
collective negotiations, other unions and employers will be required to 
submit these matters to the negotiating process. The result will un- 
doubtedly be to expand the area of mandatory bargaining, not because 
the Court prefers more inclusive bargaining, but because members of 
the industrial community expand the area of collective agreement. The 
standard is indeed flexible, not bending with judicial whims, but 
adapting to changing practices.22 
18. Ibid. 
19. Id. at 214. 
20. Id. at 211. 
21. Ibid. 
22. The standard is, of course, neither mechanical nor precise. Determining when a 
subject has become common enough in collective agreements to be considered as manda- 
tory will require a measure of judgment on the part of the Board and the Court. Also, 
drawing fine distinctions, such as between various kinds of subcontracting arrangements, 
may not be possible by looking only to existing practices. 
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In Fibreboard, the Court was confronted with an 18-year-old statu- 
tory provision which gave no explicit guidance. A workable standard 
had to be created. The Court's projected standard was expressive of the 
underlying policy of the provision; it gave continuing viability to the 
duty to bargain in a changing industrial society; and, most important, 
the Court avoided imposing its subjective judgment as to what matters 
are "at the core of managerial control" but looked to the objective 
judgment of unions and employers as evidenced by their collective 
agreements. A more constructive solution cannot be expected of the 
Court. 
ANTI-UNION PLANT CLOSURES-DISCRIMINATION AT DARLINGTON 
The Court's performance in the much publicized Darlington Mills23 
case was of quite a different character, leaving in its wake disturbing 
doubts if not destruction. Darlington Manufacturing Company, which 
operated a single textile mill, was one of twenty-seven mills controlled 
by the Milliken family through Deering Milliken & Company, a New 
York selling house. When the Textile Workers Union sought to or- 
ganize Darlington and petitioned for a representation election, Darling- 
ton threatened to close the mill if the union won the election. The 
union won the election by a narrow margin and Darlington made good 
its threat, selling its plant and machinery piecemeal and liquidating the 
corporation. 
The NLRB found that this closing was motivated not by economic 
considerations but solely by anti-union animus. The Board held that 
Darlington had thereby discriminatorily discharged its employees in 
violation of Section 8(a)(3). The Board further held, in the alternative, 
that since Darlington was a part of a single integrated employer group, 
Deering Milliken had, by closing part of its enterprise unlawfully dis- 
criminated against the employees. As a remedy the Board ordered back 
pay for all Darlington employees until they received substantially 
equivalent employment or were put on preferential hiring lists at other 
Deering Milliken mills.24 
The Court confronted both alternatives posed by the Board's decision 
-first, that Darlington as a separate employer had violated the statute 
by going completely out of business without providing for its em- 
ployees; and second, that Deering Milliken as a single enterprise had 
violated the statute by closing part of its business. 
On the first alternative, the Court flatly rejected the contention that 
an employer can, by going out of business, commit an unfair labor 
23. NLRB v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). 
24. 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962), enforcement denied 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963). 
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practice, even though the "liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness 
towards the union."25 The Court, as its premise and conclusion, 
declared: 
A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of 
business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation 
that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation 
of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing 
the Labor Relations Act. We find neither.20 
We might wonder whether the Court has not grown suddenly and 
strangely timid to be so easily startled by innovations, were not its own 
conclusions so startling. For the Court has concluded that an employer 
can discharge his employees solely because they have voted for a union. 
The employer can thus not only punish his own employees in a way 
which they will long remember, but can also provide a vivid object 
lesson to all others who consider challenging their anti-union employers. 
This, under a statute which guarantees to workers the right to bargain 
through representatives of their own choosing, which prohibits em- 
ployers from coercing employees in the free exercise of their rights, and 
which specifically bans "discrimination . . . in employment to . .. dis- 
courage membership in any labor organization."27 
One would have thought that the bare words of the statute would be a 
clear enough manifestation of legislative intent. But if the Court found 
that Congress has not spoken clearly, then the Court's own words in 
Radio Officers'28 should have sufficed, for there the Court cut through 
the words of Section 8(a)(3) to declare: 
The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their 
organizational rights. Thus Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) were de- 
signed to allow employees to freely exercise their right to join 
unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members . . . without imperil- 
ing their livelihood.29 
The rationale of the Court in Darlington Mills is nearly as startling 
as its conclusion. To the argument that the employer's closing his plant 
was similar to a discriminatory lockout or a runaway shop, the Court 
answered that, "One of the purposes of the . . . Act is to prohibit the 
discriminatory use of economic weapons to obtain future benefits."30 
25. 380 U.S. at 274. 
26. Id. at 270. 
27. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. ? 158 (1964). 
28. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). 
29. 347 U.S. at 40. 
30. 380 U.S. at 271-72. 
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The discriminatory lockout and runaway shop discourage collective 
employee activities in the future. "But a complete liquidation of a 
business," said the Court, "yields no such future benefit for the em- 
ployer."3' We had always supposed that the purpose of the statute was 
affirmatively to protect employees in the exercise of their rights, not 
merely to preclude employers from profiting from destruction of those 
rights. Indeed, the dominant remedial principle, particularly in Section 
8(a)(3) violations, has always been to make the injured employees whole 
and not merely to deprive the employer of his ill-gotten gains.32 
To reinforce its conclusion the Court suggests that the Board's rule 
was aimed at an unlikely evil-the possibility that employers will stand 
on principle and liquidate their businesses is "surely too remote to be 
considered [a danger] at which the labor statutes were aimed."33 Apart 
from the question of what evidence or expertise the Court relies to make 
this judgment, this is to see no teeth in the bear's tail. For the right to 
close a business has at the other end the far more real danger-the right 
to warn employees in advance, just as Darlington did. The Court, in a 
footnote, denies that its decision would justify an employer "threaten- 
ing" to close his plant, but acknowledges that he could "announce a 
decision to close already reached"34 if the employees vote for the union. 
The employer determined to defeat unionization needs no more. He can 
make a "definite decision" prior to the election and trumpet it to the 
employees. If the employees take his threat seriously and vote against 
the union, the definitiveness of his decision can never be tested. If the 
employees gamble that he is bluffing and vote for the union, he can 
continue operations. Though the Board can find that his "decision" was 
a "threat" and an unfair labor practice, its cease and desist order will be 
painless. He can be ordered not to threaten again, but he will certainly 
not be ordered to fulfill his "decision." The employer thus runs no real 
risk while the union must ask the employees to play Russian roulette 
with their jobs. Permeating this part of the opinion is judicial tender- 
ness toward "the employer's right to go out of business." The Court 
conjures up the vision of an employer being ordered to remain in busi- 
ness, ignoring that the Board had ordered only that employees be put 
on preferential hiring lists in other Deering Milliken plants. The 
question was not whether an employer could choose to go out of busi- 
31. Id. at 272. 
32. See, for example, Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); Phelps Dodge 
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). 
33. 380 U.S. at 272. 
34. Id. at 274, n.20. 
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ness but whether, if he did so choose, he could be required to make 
whole employees whom he discriminatorily discharged. 
The second branch of the Court's decision is even more baffling and 
disturbing. If Darlington was an integral part of the Deering Milliken 
enterprise, then there was only a partial closing. A discriminatory 
partial closing, said the Court, can be an unfair labor practice for it may 
discourage "the free exercise of Section 7 rights among remaining em- 
ployees."35 To be an unfair labor practice, two elements must be 
present. In the Court's words, 
a partial closing is an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(3) if 
motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining 
plants of the single employer and if the employer may reasonably 
have foreseen that such closing would likely have that effect.36 
Because the Board's findings failed to establish the "vital requisites" 
of purpose and effect, the Court remanded the case for further findings. 
It did not suffice to argue that a partial closing for openly avowed 
discriminatory reasons necessarily had an adverse impact on unioniza- 
tion. A showing of motivation to achieve that effect is necessary, and 
explicit Board findings are necessary "in an area which trenches so 
closely upon otherwise legitimate employer prerogatives."37 
The Court's phrasing of the required findings is puzzling, but the 
core of the requirement is plain. It is not enough that Deering Milliken 
discharged part of its employees because they voted for the union. It is 
not enough that such discharge had the effect of intimidating the 
remaining employees. There must be an express finding that the motiva- 
tion for discharging some is to intimidate the others. The Board may 
have little difficulty in making the necessary findings in this case, but 
only because of the employer's lack of finesse. If a multi-plant employer 
closes his only unionized plant but vigorously asserts to his other em- 
ployees that the closure was solely for economic reasons, proof of the 
necessary purpose to intimidate the remaining employees may be ex- 
tremely difficult. Indeed, such motivation may in fact be absent, for it is 
enough for the employer that he has escaped collective bargaining in 
the only plant where the employees chose to unionize. Similarly, if a 
runaway employer reopens in a non-union area under a new name, 
concealing from his new employees that he is a fugitive from collective 
bargaining, proof of either the purpose or the effect of intimidating his 
new employees will be impossible. He is content to be rid of the union 
35. Id. at 275. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Id. at 276. 
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for the time being, and if his new employees organize, he can make 
another quiet escape. This scarcely guarantees to employees the right to 
bargain through representatives of their own choosing. 
The mischief in the Court's reasoning is that it ignores the rights of 
those who have been discriminatorily discharged. The essence of the 
Court's logic is that discharge for supporting the union is not itself an 
unfair labor practice, that it is no wrong as to the ones discharged, and 
that the law is not concerned with their injury. Discrimination against 
them is an evil only when it intimidates others; any remedy given them 
is only to make others feel secure. This is to see in the execution of 
hostages nothing more than an intimidation of the living; it is to make 
murder a crime only when the killer's purpose is to instill fear. 
Explaining the Darlington decision is difficult for it is inherently in- 
credible. The results do not square with the words and purposes of the 
statute; the rationale is without precedent in Board or court decisions; 
and though the Court purports to weigh the practical impact of its 
decision, it glosses over the real and obvious dangers. The right to go 
out of business without any responsibility to employees was treated as 
an absolute right, unqualified by the rights of employees created by the 
statute. There is no clue why this right is significantly different from the 
right to close part of the business, and Fibreboard suggests that this 
right is subordinate to statutory rights. In groping for explanations one 
is tempted to wonder whether if the Court's unarticulated if not sub- 
conscious concern was not with the right of the Heart of Atlanta Motel38 
to go out of business under a somewhat parallel statute which prohibits 
discrimination. For again, labor law cases are a subordinate part of the 
Court's work and may be colored by the Court's preoccupying concerns. 
THE EMPLOYER'S ECONOMIC WEAPONS-LOCKOUTS AND REPLACEMENTS 
The most important labor law cases of the last term, both from the 
standpoint of their impact on collective bargaining and in their implica- 
tions for the lawmaking process, were the two Lockout Cases. To- 
gether, they significantly alter the relative economic strength of unions 
and employers in at least some collective bargaining relationships. 
More important to our larger purpose here, they reveal the role of 
Congress, the Board and the courts in regulating the economic weapons 
of the parties. 
In American Ship Building Company v. NLRB,39 the employer was 
engaged in repairing ships on the Great Lakes, a highly seasonal busi- 
38. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
39. 380 U.S. 300 (1965). 
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ness concentrated during the winter months when the lakes are frozen. 
When the collective agreement expired on August 1, and the parties 
were unable to reach an agreement, the union proposed a six-month 
extension-to expire at the height of the busy season. The Company 
objected to any extension which would make it more vulnerable to a 
strike, closed its yards and laid off all employees until the union agreed 
to a new two-year contract. The NLRB, following long established 
precedents, held that the lockout violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), 
because the employer's purpose was not to avert any special economic 
losses but solely to bring economic pressure on the union to secure 
prompt settlement of the dispute on favorable terms.40 
The Court rejected this analysis, saying that the Board "in essence 
denied the use of the bargaining lockout to the employer because of its 
conviction that this device would give the employer 'too much 
power.' "41 The Board's previous position limiting single employer lock- 
outs was wiped out with this declaration: 
We hold that an employer violates neither ? 8(a)(1) nor ? 8(a)(3) 
when, after a bargaining impasse has been reached, he temporarily 
shuts down his plant and lays off his employees for the sole purpose 
of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate 
bargaining position.42 
The immediate impact of this decision is obvious-the union no 
longer has exclusive control over the timing of the economic battle.43 
No longer need the employer hunker down, waiting for the union's 
attack when he is most vulnerable; he can take the initiative when he 
has maximum strength. This change can significantly alter the balance 
of bargaining power and the content of the bargain struck." The con- 
tract made at American Ship Building after a two-month lockout in 
August and September will not be the same as one made after a two 
month strike in January and February. The impact of the case will be 
40. 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963). The Board's order was enforced in NLRB v. American 
Ship Building Co., 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
41. 380 U.S. at 317. 
42. Id. at 318. 
43. The union loses control not only over the beginning of the conflict but also over 
its ending. No longer can the employees insist on reinstatement by making an uncondi- 
tional offer to return to work. The employer can continue the shut-down until the union 
has concluded a binding collective agreement. 
44. Prior to this decision the employer could often find ways of provoking a strike 
at a time advantageous to him. He could do so, however, only by taking some drastic 
action which would anger his employees beyond the union's ability to restrain them. The 
employer thus could take the initiative only at the expense of bearing the onus of unfair- 
ness and solidifying the employees' antagonism. 
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uneven; for while the timing of the economic contest may be of minor 
importance in many industries, it can be of critical importance in many 
others, ranging from automobile manufacturing to newspaper publish- 
ing. In these industries the employer now has a new economic weapon. 
Of course, the employer's control over the timing of the conflict is 
limited by the termination date of the collective agreement. But this 
restriction only means that there will be more bitter bargaining over 
this term, and in this bargaining, the employer's hand may now be 
strengthened by the lockout. 
The Court's legalization of the lockout as an instrument of economic 
pressure inevitably raises the question whether the employer, before 
locking out, must bargain to impasse with the union. American Ship 
Building had bargained to impasse, and the Court consistently included 
this element in stating its holding. But there is no other clue in its lan- 
guage or logic. The unanswered question leads us to look to other forms 
of economic force and to whether their use is conditioned on first bar- 
gaining to impasse. Unfortunately, this investigation brings us face to 
face with a larger ambiguity. Another form in which an employer can 
take the initiative in exercising force in bargaining is unilaterally to 
change the terms and conditions of employment. It is firmly settled that 
before he takes this step he must bargain to impasse.45 On the other 
hand, it is commonly assumed that a union can resort to economic force 
in the form of a strike without bargaining to impasse. At this point one 
might be tempted to consider whether a lockout should be viewed as a 
form of employer initiative, like a unilateral change, or as the counter- 
part of the strike.46 Such a pursuit of analogies, however, can only carry 
us further from the central consideration. 
The function of the statutory duty to bargain, the Court has under- 
lined in Fibreboard, is to promote the peaceful settlement of industrial 
disputes by subjecting them to the mediatory influence of negotiation. 
This view proceeds from the premise that full discussion can often 
dispel misunderstanding, change fixed positions or discover bases for 
agreement, thereby preventing industrial conflict. The purpose of the 
duty to bargain, so conceived, can be fulfilled only by requiring exhaus- 
tion of discussion before resort to economic force. The premise of 
Fibreboard thus points to the conclusion that the employer cannot 
45. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 
U.S. 217 (1949). 
46. The Court carefully avoided equating the lockout with the strike. "The correla- 
tive use of the words in the statute," said the Court, showed only "that lockouts will 
be used in the bargaining process in some fashion." 380 U.S. at 315. 
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lockout until he has bargained to impasse. If the Court arrives at this 
conclusion, can it stop there? Does not the same policy require that the 
union also exhaust discussion before resorting to economic force? The 
only justification for allowing the union to strike without first bargain- 
ing to impasse is to give it the widest freedom in timing the strike. But 
such a claim will ring hollow in a court which has declared that "there 
is nothing in the statute which would imply that the right to strike 
'carries with it' the right exclusively to determine the timing and dura- 
tion of all work stoppages."47 Indeed, the Court has hinted in previous 
cases that for the union to strike first and talk later might constitute a 
violation of the duty to bargain in good faith.48 
The practical impact of American Ship Building on the relative 
economic strength of the parties cannot be measured without knowing 
whether, and under what conditions, an employer who has locked out 
his employees can hire replacements to do their work. The companion 
case, NLRB v. Brown,49 gives only a partial answer. The union, after 
failing to reach an agreement with an employer group of six retail food 
stores, struck one of them. The other five immediately locked out all 
employees represented by the union, and all six continued to carry on 
business with the aid of temporary replacements. When a collective 
agreement was signed, the employers released the replacements and 
reinstated all strikers and locked out employees. The Board held that 
under Buffalo Linen,50 the employers were entitled to lockout to pre- 
serve the multiple employer unit from disintegration by the union's 
whipsaw strike, but that hiring replacements for locked out employees 
constituted a violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3).5' 
The Court, however, was unable to "see how the continued opera- 
tions of the respondents and their use of temporary replacements ... are 
inherently more destructive of employees rights than is the lockout 
itself."52 Both were part of a defensive measure to preserve the multiple- 
employer group in the face of a whipsaw strike. Since the struck em- 
ployer could, under Mackay Radio,53 use replacements to remain open, 
the other employers must also be entitled to do so or they would be 
47. Id. at 310. 
48. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) n.15. In NLRB v. 
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) the Court inferentially suggests that if 
employees who have a grievance walk out without first making known their grievance 
to management, their strike might not be a protected activity. 
49. 380 U.S. 278 (1965). 
50. NLRB v. Local 449, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). 
51. 137 N.L.R.B 73 (1962), enforcement denied, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963). 
52. 380 U.S. at 284. 
53. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 US. 333 (1938). 
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placed at a competitive disadvantage and become the victims of the 
union's whipsaw. The employers' action "was a measure reasonably 
adapted to the achievement of a legitimate end-preserving the in- 
tegrity of the multiple employer bargaining unit."54 
The Court need have said no more. It could have cautiously limited 
its logic to applying existing rules on replacements-that where the 
union took the initiative and struck one member of an employer group, 
the others could treat the whipsaw as a strike directed against all of them 
and use the normal defensive measure of hiring replacements. Brown 
might, therefore, have been only a special application of the Mackay 
rule. The Court's plunging into the new problems posed by its holding 
in American Ship Building that the employer might take the initiative 
could have been postponed until the Board had an opportunity to study 
the problems and evolve solutions in concrete cases. 
However, the Court felt compelled to reach out for a broader formu- 
lation applicable to all lockouts: 
When the resulting harm to employee rights is thus compara- 
tively slight, and a substantial and legitimate business end is 
served, the employers' conduct is prima facie lawful.55 
Or more directly, in the absence of anti-union motivations, the legality 
of hiring replacements depends on a balancing of these conflicting 
interests. This broader formulation, however, adds little light; rather, 
it all but blows the candle out. Are the weights altered when the em- 
ployer initiates the shutdown, as in American Ship Building? Does the 
hiring of replacements then result in greater "harm to employee rights," 
and does the employer's preventive action make replacements serve any 
less "a substantial and legitimate business end?" Is the balance tipped 
because the replacements are permanent rather than temporary? The 
economic impact on the employee is more severe, is this a greater harm 
to his "rights"? And does the employer's difficulty in obtaining tem- 
porary employees and his disruption in dismissing them mean that 
permanent replacements serve a more "substantial and legitimate busi- 
ness end." Indeed, the Court's formulation fails even to explain Brown 
itself. When an employee who offers to continue working on his em- 
ployer's terms is temporarily replaced solely because he is represented 
by the union, why is the injury to his rights "comparatively slight"? And 
when integrity of the bargaining unit could be preserved by the five 
employers who locked out insisting that the one struck also close, why 
54. 380 U.S. at 289. 
55. Ibid. 
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does their all staying open serve a substantial business end? We know 
it is so only because the Court says it is so. And when we try to analyze 
the balancing process we begin to sense that we do not even know what 
interests are to be placed in the scales. 
The conflicting interests to be weighed begin to emerge in American 
Ship Building where the Court used the same balancing approach in 
upholding the lockout. Quoting from Erie Resistor,56 the Court said 
that determining the legality of the employer's economic measures 
entails the- 
delicate task.. of weighing the interests of employees in concerted 
activity against the interest of the employer in operating his busi- 
ness in a particular manner.57 
In the context of an economic strike or a bargaining lockout the in- 
terests of the employees is to use economic force to make their bargain- 
ing demands effective. The employer's interest is likewise to use 
economic force to resist the union's demands and to run the business on 
terms acceptable to him. The interest of each is to muster an arsenal of 
economic weapons sufficient to overcome its opponent. In each case the 
weighing process is one of parcelling out those weapons to the opposing 
parties. Mackay Radio gave to the employer the weapon of permanent 
replacements to counteract the union's weapon of the strike; Buffalo 
Linen gave to multiple employer groups the right to lockout to defend 
against the too effective whipsaw strike; and Erie Resistor refused to 
allow the employer to lengthen his replacement weapon by adding 
twenty years superseniority. 
Despite its disarming formulation, what the Court is balancing is not 
legal rights but economic weapons. In American Ship Building the 
Court is simply asserting that in its judgment the employer should not 
be denied the strategic advantage of picking the time of battle; and in 
Brown the Court concludes that to defend against a whipsaw strike, the 
employer needs to have the added weapon of hiring temporary replace- 
ments. Another year the Court will declare what other combinations of 
weapons are needed, and will then patiently, if unhelpfully, explain 
that balancing of the interests requires the result. 
Once we see clearly that the problem in the Lockout Cases is one of 
allocating weapons, we can confront the question of how that allocation 
is to be made. Certainly, the legal status of economic weapons does not 
depend on logic. The elaborate rationalizations of the Court are cal- 
56. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). 
57. American Ship Building Co. v. Labor Board, 380 U.S. 312 (1964). 
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culated to confuse everyone, including the Justices. Not even the 
venerable Mackay Radio rule has any inherent logic. Quite the contrary. 
In logical terms, for the employer to hire replacements is a form of 
individual bargaining and a denial of the union's statutory status as 
exclusive representative. For the employer to retain permanent replace- 
ments after the strike is to give preference to those who do not strike- 
logically a form of discrimination. Logic and the words of the statute 
would have led to the conclusion that when the majority union struck, 
the employer could not operate until he reached an agreement with the 
representative of his employees. The right to hire permanent replace- 
ments for strikers was based simply on the Board's practical judgment 
that employers should be allowed this countermeasure to the strike. 
Neither Buffalo Linen nor Erie Resistor have any more compelling 
logic. The Board looked to the relative effectiveness of the parties' 
economic weapons and defined their legality to prevent what it judged 
would create an imbalance of power. In each case the Court accepted 
the Board's judgment. 
The legality of economic weapons depends purely on pragmatic con- 
siderations, and the primary consideration has been achieving a rough 
equality of bargaining power. In arguing American Ship Building the 
Board candidly acknowledged that its decision was based on its expert 
judgment that availability of the lockout "would so substantially tip the 
scales in the employer's favor as to defeat the Congressional purpose of 
placing employers on a par with their adversaries at the bargaining 
table."58 
Such a frank confrontation of the problem was more than the Court 
could bear. Dusting off the birch rod of Insurance Agents,59 the Court 
accused the Board of "functioning as an arbiter of the sort of economic 
weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of their bar- 
gaining demands,"60 and twice delivered the stinging rebuke that this 
was "the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy deci- 
sions which are properly made by Congress.'"61 The Court then sub- 
stituted itself as the arbiter, invoked its balancing test, and decided 
the sort of economic weapons the parties could use. 
This is the most troublesome aspect of the Lockout Cases-the 
Court's refusal to confront the raw issue which must be decided, and its 
driving into the darkness of lightless language the actual grounds for its 
58. Ibid. 
59. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 US. 477 (1960). 
60. 361 U.S. at 312. 
61. Id. at 318. 
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decision. Of course, the statute does not give the Board "general 
authority to assess the relative economic power of the adversaries in the 
bargaining process."62 Of course, determining the weapons the party 
can use is a "major policy decision . . . properly made by Congress."63 
Of course, where Congress has given guides the Board-and the Courts 
-should follow. But Congress often gives no guides. The statute defines 
at least some of the limits on unions' economic weapons, leaving the 
Board and the Court to improvise the rest. But as the statute says 
nearly nothing about employers' economic weapons in bargaining 
disputes; the allocation has been made by fiat of Board and Court. The 
fact that these are major policy decisions does not free the Board or the 
Court from deciding, nor does it dictate their decisions. It does mean, 
however, that sensible decisions cannot be made by denying that they 
necessarily involve problems of policy. We cannot usefully discuss 
whether the Lockout Cases were sensibly decided, or how their offspring 
should be decided, until we get an exploration of the relevant economic 
facts and social values.64 And this difficult task is not even begun. 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS 
-MINE WORKERS AND MEAT CUTTERS 
The long and tortuous path of the anti-trust laws' application to labor 
unions and collective bargaining took two sudden turns in the Supreme 
Court last term. For over forty years the courts used the Sherman Act as 
an instrument for curbing union activities. The ambiguous provisions 
of the Clayton Act served only to bind the chains tighter by adding the 
injunction remedy.65 Finally, in 1941, Mr. Justice Frankfurter dis- 
covered a key in the Norris-LaGuardia Act and in United States v. 
Hutcheson66 freed unions from the shackles of the anti-trust laws. That 
is, all but one shackle-"so long as the union acts in self interest and 
62. Id. at 317. 
63. Id. at 318. 
64. Even casual examination reveals major flaws in the "balancing of bargaining 
power" approach. What constitutes a proper balance depends largely upon the personal 
predelictions of the balancer. Even apart from this, the relative strength of unions and 
employers is not the same in all industries or regions, and may change with the business 
cycle and level of unemployment. We do not know whether the lockout would strengthen 
employers who are relatively weak or relatively strong. The same is true of the hiring of 
replacements. Full inquiry might lead to full scepticism of any test. But that itself may 
be a guide. For when dealing with a going collective bargaining system, there is a signi- 
ficant value in keeping the rules unchanged and not upsetting an existing equilibrium. 
If the Court (or the Board) does not know whether or not its decision will help, then 
perhaps it should leave the existing arbitrary rules be. 
65. 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. ? 27 (1958). 
66. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). 
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does not combine with non-labor groups."67 This exception was applied 
four years later in Allen-Bradley68 where the Electrical Workers had 
combined with electrical contractors and manufacturers to rig the New 
York market and exclude all outside competition. For twenty years the 
reach of this case was debated but the Court kept its silence. Now the 
Court has spoken twice and pushed the law down two unexplored paths. 
In United Mine Workers v. Pennington,69 the union was sued by a 
small mine company for having conspired with an association of large 
mine companies to drive the small mines out of business. The jury 
found there was a conspiracy and awarded treble damages of $270,000. 
The core of the conspiracy was a collective bargaining agreement 
between the union and the larger operators first made in 1950 to elim- 
inate overproduction and bring stability to the industry. The union 
agreed not to resist mechanization, and the employers agreed to increase 
wages as productivity increased. The union further agreed that it would 
impose the same wage terms on all of the small mine operators, even 
though they were unable to mechanize and therefore unable to pay the 
wages. By closing the small mines, overproduction would be avoided. 
The union and the large operators took other steps to prevent the small 
mines from escaping by operating non-union. The large operators 
agreed not to lease coal lands to non-union operators and not to sell or 
buy coal from such companies. The parties cooperated in obtaining 
Walsh-Healy wage orders incorporating the union wages and in induc- 
ing TVA to change its purchasing program to foreclose purchases from 
the small mines. In addition, four of the larger companies waged a 
destructive and collusive price-cutting campaign aimed at the small non- 
union mines. Two of these companies were ones in which the union 
had large investments and over which it could exercise control. 
Passing quickly over other elements of the conspiracy, the Court 
centered its attention on the provision in the collective agreement that 
the union would impose on other operators the same wages regardless 
of the employer's mechanization or ability to pay.70 It was this provision 
which the Court found subjected the union to the anti-trust laws. Said 
the Court, 
67. Id. at 232. 
68. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, I.B.E.W., 325 U.S. 797 (1945). 
69. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
70. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice White and discussion is 
focused on that opinion. It represents a kind of middle ground between the concurring 
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Clark 
agreed and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg with whom Mr. Justice Harlan 
and Mr. Justice Stewart agreed. 
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[W]e think a union forfeits its exemption from the anti-trust laws 
when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers 
to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units.71 
The Court made clear that the union could make a wage agreement 
with a multiple employer bargaining unit. Also, the union could, as a 
matter of its own policy, seek to standardize wages among employers or 
to allow differentials because of the employer's competitive position. 
What the union could not do was agree with the employers in one 
bargaining unit to seek particular terms from employers in another 
bargaining unit. Such an agreement was bad "without regard to preda- 
tory intention or effect in the particular case."72 The vice in the agree- 
ment is that "the union surrenders its freedom of action with respect to 
its bargaining policy" and its interest becomes bound to that of the 
employer.73 "It is just such restraints upon freedom of action to act 
according to their own choice and discretion," said the Court, "that run 
counter to anti-trust policy."74 
The repercussions of this decision will be felt immediately in the 
content of collective agreements, for the parties must hasten to excise 
such clauses and prayerfully count the days until the limitation period 
on treble damage actions runs. A wide range of clauses, variously 
worded but having the same restraining effect, may fall within the 
compass of the prohibition. For example, a "most favored nation" 
clause does not directly require the union to bargain for the same terms, 
but failure to do so has such grievous consequences that the union has 
effectively surrendered its freedom of action as to its bargaining policy. 
The anti-trust laws are seldom distracted from substance by form. 
The repercussions reach beyond the agreement to the bargaining 
process. No more can an employer before signing an agreement ask 
the union for assurances that it will go to his competitors and do like- 
wise, nor can the union as an inducement promise to do so. The em- 
ployer might ask the union whether its bargaining policy was to 
standardize wages and the union might say that it was. Though in form 
no violation, this exchange might appear to a jury to be an implied 
understanding. Thus an important matter of mutual concern can be 
brought to the bargaining table only at the risk of a treble damage 
action. 
The impact of the case may be to inhibit unions from enforcing 
71. 381 U.S. at 665, n.2. 
72. Id. at 668. 
73. Ibid. 
74. Ibid. 
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standardized wage policies in spite of the Court's efforts to allay such 
fears. The Court explicitly states that the union acting unilaterally can 
vigorously implement such a policy even though it knows that some 
employers cannot compete. It further states that, "such union conduct 
is not alone sufficient evidence.... There must be additional direct or 
indirect evidence of the conspiracy."75 But a prudent union might well 
fear the findings of a jury when suit is brought by an employer driven 
out of business by the union's demands. 
The second case before the Court was another cup of tea.76 The 
Meat Cutters Union negotiated with an employers' association of inde- 
pendent meat retailers for a provision which limited market operating 
hours to 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. Jewel Tea objected to this provision because it 
would prevent the sale of pre-packaged meat on a self-service basis in its 
supermarkets during evening hours. Under the duress of a strike vote, 
Jewel signed and then sued the union for damages under the anti-trust 
laws. After a trial without a jury the judge dismissed the case. He found 
no evidence of an agreement between the union and the employers' 
association to force the restrictive marketing hours on Jewel, and con- 
cluded that the union acted unilaterally to enforce its own bargaining 
policy. He further found that the union, in limiting the hours of sale, 
was seeking to protect working standards, for if meat counters were 
open, the butchers would be required either to do night work or to 
leave their work to be done by others unskilled in the trade.77 
The lower court's findings that there was no agreement between the 
union and the association to impose the marketing hours restriction on 
Jewel precluded any violation under UMW v. Pennington. This, 
however, did not end the inquiry.78 The mere fact that the collective 
agreement was between a single employer and a single union represent- 
ing its employees does not mean, said Mr. Justice White, that the agree- 
ment is immune from attack under the anti-trust laws. If, for example, 
the union had demanded that Jewel maintain a certain schedule of 
prices and Jewel had agreed, there would be serious doubt, whether 
75. 381 U.S. at 665, n.2. 
76. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL-CIO v. Jewel Tea Co., 380 U.S. 676 
(1965). 
77. Jewel Tea Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 215 F. Supp. 837 (1963), reversed, 
331 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1964). 
78. On the underlying issues the division of the Court in this case was the same as in 
UMW v. Pennington. See note 70 supra. Here, Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion is a dissent 
and Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion is a concurrence. Again, discussion is focused on Mr. 
Justice White's opinion. Because the three Justices joining in the Goldberg opinion 
concur only in the judgment, there is no opinion of the Court in this case. 
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either the union or Jewel could claim immunity by reason of the labor 
exemption. The immunity extends only to those matters which are 
"intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions." In view 
of the trial judge's findings that night operations were not feasible 
without having either butchers or other employees present to service 
the meat counters, the marketing hours provision was "a subject of 
immediate and legitimate concern to union members,"80 and was im- 
mune from attack. 
Although the union escaped liability, collective agreements were 
made captives of the anti-trust laws. Even a simple agreement between 
a union and an employer loses its immunity if it regulates matters 
not "intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions."8' 
Although the location of the line is left in doubt, it is generally the same 
line as that separating mandatory and non-mandatory subjects of bar- 
gaining. Thus, any agreement on a non-mandatory subject may lose its 
claim to immunity, and if then found to be an unreasonable restraint 
on competition, will constitute a violation of the anti-trust laws.82 
The most troublesome aspect of this decision is that the question 
whether the particular subject is "intimately related" to terms and con- 
ditions of employment will be decided in the District Court and often 
by a jury. The Court suggested that if self-service markets could operate 
without butchers after 6 p.m., then the marketing hours limitation 
might be viewed as nothing but an effort by the union to protect one 
group of employers from competition by another. The likelihood that 
a jury would so find is not remote. Many other provisions which could 
come within the broad reaches of mandatory bargaining may be seen 
by juries or district judges as having no purpose other than to protect 
against competition. Appellate review of such decisions, embedded as 
they are in subsidiary factual determinations, provides small safeguard. 
Any understanding of why the Court reached these decisions must 
begin with the troubling question which was at the core of the Mine 
Workers case-why should a union's agreement to enforce a standard- 
ized wage cause the union to forfeit its exemption from the anti-trust 
laws? As Mr. Justice Goldberg reminds us in his dissenting opinion, 
one of the values of competition is to reward the most efficient producer 
79. 381 U.S. at 689. 
80. Id. at 692. 
81. Id. at 689. 
82. The Court here bleeds some of the vitality from Fibreboard, for unions and 
employers may now be reluctant to bargain concerning non-mandatory subjects and thus 
not develop many practices which will permit growth in the scope of collective bargain- 
ing. 
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and this objective is not achieved when employers compete on the basis 
of who pays the lowest wages. One of the functions of collective bargain- 
ing, as conceived and practiced in this country, is the elimination of 
price competition based on differences in labor standards. The national 
labor policy affirmatively promoted by the National Labor Relations 
Act endorses this focusing of competition on factors other than labor 
standards. An agreement to enforce standardized wages would therefore 
seem to fulfill, not to frustrate the purposes of both the labor acts and 
the anti-trust laws. 
Both of the cases before the Court, however, made plain two rudi- 
mentary economic facts. First, the union's bargaining practices signifi- 
cantly affect the relative positions of competitors in the product market. 
By changing its bargaining practices, the union can change those rela- 
tive positions, just as the Mine Workers change in 1950 made it difficult 
for small mines to compete. If the union allows differentials between 
employers, the size of those differentials can decide who will survive 
and who will perish. Second, uniform labor standards may disguise 
unequal treatment because of differences in employers' methods of 
operations. The Meat Cutters, by standardizing closing hours, could 
curb competition of supermarkets with independent retailers. The 
Miners, with a standardized wage scale, could aid either mechanized or 
non-mechanized mines, depending on whether that scale was high or 
low. The Court could not fail to see the impossibility of drawing a line 
between agreements to enforce standardized terms and agreements to 
enforce differentials. 
The evil which the Court saw potential in the two cases before it is 
that one group of employers will enlist the bargaining power of the 
union to drive competitors out of business. Concessions would be 
granted to the union on the condition that it force on competitors terms 
which would make them unable to compete. The danger, as both cases 
warned, is as great when the terms are uniform in form as when they 
are baldly discriminatory. 
The Mine Workers decision, however, gave only partial protection 
from this anti-competitive potential of collective bargaining, for it 
barred only the union's acting at the behest of an employer. But the 
Meat Cutters did not need to be told, much less urged, by the employers' 
association that to protect butcher's jobs in small stores it should impose 
closing hours on self-service in supermarkets. And the Mine Workers 
might well have unilaterally determined that higher wages for fewer 
members was preferable to preserving jobs in mines which could not 
pay more. Restrictions on bargaining policies of unions, however, 
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would cut too deeply into the policy of the Labor Relations Acts. The 
Court felt compelled to limit its protection to agreements which sought 
to "prescribe labor standards outside the bargaining unit"83 -agree- 
ments which themselves conflicted with the policies of the Labor Rela- 
tions Acts. 
The Meat Cutters decision was an effort to partially close the door 
left open in Mine Workers. A union acting unilaterally lost its exemp- 
tion from the anti-trust laws when it sought terms not intimately related 
to wages, hours and working conditions. The terms and conditions of 
employment bargained by the union may have an anti-competitive 
effect and are susceptible to manipulation for anti-competitive purposes, 
just as are matters not related to employment. But again, the policy of 
the Labor Acts counsels the Court against restricting the union's free- 
dom to bargain so long as it stays within the range of subjects appro- 
priate for bargaining under those Acts. 
The end result is that these decisions reach only fragments of the 
anti-competitive potential which the Court saw in certain bargaining 
policies and practices. This meagre result is achieved at a cost of sub- 
jecting collective agreements and bargaining negotiations to the scru- 
tiny of district judges and juries for hidden agreements and improper 
purposes. The history of the anti-trust warns of the dangers involved 
in opening courts to inquiries of this nature in labor matters. 
The Court had another alternative-to follow the central thrust of 
United States v. Hutcheson,84 that the anti-trust laws are wholly un- 
suited for the regulation of labor relations. From Danbury Hatters85 to 
A len Bradley86 the Court tried to develop rules or principles to relate 
the anti-trust laws to union activities and collective bargaining, but 
every effort failed.87 No principle proved adequate, and every rule 
disintegrated into unworkable distinctions.88 The Court was reluctant 
83. 381 U.S. at 668. 
84. 312 U.S. 219 (1940). 
85. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). 
86. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, I.B.E.W., 325 U.S. 797 (1945). 
87. For a devastating analysis of the Court's decisions and its failure to reconcile the 
conflict between free competition and collective bargaining, see Winter, Collective Bar- 
gaining and Competition: The Application of Anti-Trust Statutes to Union Activities, 
73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963). 
88. The failure stems not from the fault of the Court, but from the impossibility of 
the task. Two of the most thoughtful and perceptive students of the problem have 
arrived at essentially the same conclusion-reconciliation of the two policies is impossible 
and efforts to regulate labor under the anti-trust laws is hopeless or dangerous. See 
Winter, supra note 87; Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and the Anti-Trust 
Laws, 32 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 659 (1965). 
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to quit the field and leave it unregulated, but the reasons for that 
reluctance are now gone. Since Allen Bradley the National Labor Rela- 
tions Act has been twice amended, and those amendments regulate the 
kinds of economic activities which had been the principal objects of 
attack in the labor cases involving the anti-trust laws-secondary boy- 
cotts, jurisdictional disputes, and hot-cargo clauses.89 The Court could 
now withdraw, for at least the strategic areas of the field has been occu- 
pied by Congress. 
The opinions in both Mine Workers and Meat Cutters betray that 
the Court is dealing with problems well within the reach of the Na- 
tional Labor Relations Act. The Court's test of the legality of the collec- 
tive agreement is controlled by that Act; indeed, the kinds of conduct 
which the Court finds violative of the anti-trust laws involve unfair 
labor practices. Thus, for employers like the large mine operators to 
insist that as a condition of making a collective agreement the union 
promise to enforce the same terms on others would clearly be a refusal 
to bargain in good faith.90 For a union to agree, as the Mine Workers 
did, to refuse to consider any variation in negotiating with a small mine 
operator would seem to require a fixedness of position inconsistent with 
its duty to bargain. For a union like the Meat Cutters to insist on 
market closing hours when this was not related to terms and conditions 
of employment would likewise be a refusal to bargain.91 In short, the 
employers in these cases who claimed they were injured by the union's 
bargaining practices would have had potential remedies before the 
NLRB. The Court need not have allowed them, under the guise of the 
anti-trust laws, to litigate essentially the same issues in the district court 
and before a jury. 
The Court could have used the two cases before it to withdraw from 
the impossible judicial task of regulating collective bargaining under 
the anti-trust laws. Nothing in the cases suggested that regulation under 
the Labor Acts was inadequate. As Mr. Justice Goldberg pointed out, 
the devices used by the Mine Workers bristled with potential unfair 
labor practices. And the very collective agreements attacked were the 
product and producers of potential unfair labor practices. The Court 
could have declared that the regulation of collective bargaining was 
89. The chief exception was Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 
268 U.S. 295 (1925). which the Court now seems to repudiate, for the core of the union's 
conduct in that case was the union's unilateral enforcement of its own policy of standard- 
izing labor standards. 
90. American Range Lines Inc., 13 N.L.R.B. 139 (1939); Newton Chevrolet, Inc., 37 
N.L.R.B. 334 (1941). 
91. NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
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solely for the provisions and procedures of the Labor Acts. If those Acts 
prove inadequate, Congress is always available to make new laws. 
Perhaps it can do better than the Court-it is not likely to do worse. 
THE COURT, CONGRESS AND THE BOARD-WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE? 
The narrow focus on individual cases and their substantive impact 
pushes into the blurred background the roles being played by the 
Court, the Congress and the NLRB in evolving our labor law, and 
through it our national labor policy. But the process through which our 
labor law is made raises the more pervasive problems, for not only does 
the process affect the substance but it raises disturbing doubts as to the 
adequacy of existing legal institutions. The cases during the past year 
lay bare three characteristics of our lawmaking process. 
First, the Court is confronted with cases which require it to decide 
controversial issues cutting near the core of national labor policy. In 
Fibreboard the Court had to decide what decisions in the operating of 
a business should be brought within the framework of collective bar- 
gaining and therefore within the reach of union influence by economic 
pressure. The scope of management prerogatives is not only one of the 
bitterest issues at the bargaining table; in its legal form it involves basic 
issues of public policy. The line between mandatory and non-mandatory 
subjects of bargaining defines not only the matters which management 
must discuss, but also the purposes for which a union can strike. It 
determines those business decisions which shall be subject to shared 
control and resolved by economic contest between union and employer. 
The determination of which subjects are within the framework of col- 
lective bargaining is but a step removed from the determination of 
whether or not there shall be collective bargaining at all. 
In the Lockout Cases the Court had to decide what instruments of 
economic pressure should be available to each party. The instruments 
involved-the lockout and replacements-were not minor but major 
devices which could in many situations determine the balance of bar- 
gaining power and ultimately influence the content of the collective 
agreement. As the Court said in a different context, determining their 
legality was a "major policy decision properly made by Congress."92 The 
Anti-Trust Cases required the Court to accommodate collective bargain- 
ing and free competition; to determine the balance between two major 
national policies. And it confronted that question at the most sensitive 
spot-the regulation of labor standards through collective agreements as 
a factor controlling competition in the product market. 
92. American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 US. 300, 318 (1965). 
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Second, the Court is compelled to make these substantial policy deci- 
sions with little or no guidance from Congress. Mr. Justice Stewart's 
recitation of statutory history in Fibreboard underlines that Congress 
did not, either by word or intent, mark the boundaries of bargainable 
subjects. On the contrary, it deliberately refused either to mark the 
boundaries or to say there were none. In 1947, the House bill explicitly 
limited bargaining to a detailed list of subjects, but the Conference 
Committee substituted the elastic terms "wages, hours and other terms 
and conditions of employment." No clue was given how far these could 
stretch, but only a vague assurance that there were some limits. Congress 
has been even more tight-lipped on the legality of the lockout. Despite 
awareness of the problem, Taft-Hartley contained only tantalizingly 
ambiguous references.93 For eighteen years successive Boards and Courts 
of Appeal have battled over the proper balance to be struck in allowing 
lockouts.94 Once before, in Buffalo Linen,95 the Supreme Court was 
required to act as final arbiter. Throughout this heated controversy, 
Congress maintained a stony silence, defaulting to the Court the re- 
sponsibility for making this "major policy decision." 
The failure or refusal of Congress to make hard policy decisions is 
exemplified in the history of the anti-trust laws. In 1890, the application 
of anti-trust restrictions to unions was hotly debated in the Senate, but 
the statute when passed was conspicuously silent.96 As the courts began 
to erect a legal structure on this sandy foundation of the absence of 
intent, perennial proposals were made to specifically exempt unions, 
but all of these died in committee.97 In 1914, after extended and bitter 
debate over immunizing unions from attack under the anti-trust laws, 
Congress wrote Sections 6 and 20 into the Clayton Act.98 But both 
committee reports and debates contained directly contradictory dec- 
larations of what these sections would do. In the words of Professor 
93. In Sections 8(d), 203(c), 206, and 208(a), the terms "strike or lockout" were linked, 
but in all of these sections the concern was with preventing disruptions of production, 
not with defining the legality of particular economic weapons. 61 Stat. 142, 154, 155 (1947), 
29 U.S.C. ?? 158, 173, 176, 178 (1958). 
94. For descriptions of this continuing battle, see Koretz, Legality of the Lockout, 
4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 251 (1953); Koretz, The Lockout Revisited, 7 SYRACUSE L. REV. 263 
(1956); Meltzer, Single Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts under the Taft-Hartley 
Act, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 70 (1956); Meltzer, Lockouts under the Labor Management Rela- 
tions Acts: New Shadows on an Old Terrain, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 614 (1961). 
95. 353 U.S. 87 (1957). 
96. For recounting of the history and the opposite inferences to be drawn, see 
BOWMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT (1930) p. 35-41, and MASON, ORGANIZED LABOR AND 
THE LAW (1925) p. 119-31. 
97. See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) pp. 139-41. 
98. 38 Stat. 731, 738 (1914), 15 U.S.C. ? 17, 29 U.S.C. ? 52 (1958). 
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Frankfurter, "The debates in Congress looked both ways .... The Su- 
preme Court had to find meaning where Congress had done its best to 
conceal meaning."99 Senator Norris cautiously avoided touching this 
issue in drafting the Norris-La Guardia Act100 and Professor Frank- 
furter in his hard-backed brief for the Act insisted that it gave immunity 
only from equitable as distinguished from legal remedies-"hitherto 
unlawful conduct remains unlawful."101 Silence continued when Con- 
gress passed the Wagner Act with no indication that it was aware of the 
need to reconcile the policy of encouraging collective bargaining with 
that of protecting competition. United States v. Hutcheson turned the 
issue upside down, but Congress still said nothing. The Hartley Bill 
passed by the House in 1947 would have removed the exemption of 
unions created by that case, but the Conference Committee preferred 
silence.102 The debate has continued; proposals are regularly introduced 
into Congress to define the relation between union activities, collective 
bargaining, and the anti-trust laws, but Congress still refuses to speak. 
For seventy-five years Congress has shifted to the Court the responsi- 
bility for making the basic decisions of policy. This is a delegation of 
lawmaking without standards, for Congress has failed to find or to agree 
upon any guiding principles. The Mine Workers and Meat Cutters 
cases serve to underline that it is because of the default of Congress that 
the Court is in charge. 
Third, the Court, confronted with difficult and delicate issues which 
it must resolve without guidance from Congress, does not rely upon the 
National Labor Relations Board for enlightenment or counsel. In its 
opinions during the last term the Court has plainly displayed a marked 
lack of confidence in the Board. Although the Court enforced the 
Board's order in Fibreboard, it attributed no weight to the Board's 
judgment and did not even invoke the Board's expertise to reinforce its 
own controversial decision. Later, in Meat Cutters the Court genu- 
flected before the Board's expertise in determining bargainable subjects, 
and then made the determination for itself. In Darlington, the Court 
completely discarded the Board's judgment as to the impact of actual 
or threatened discriminatory plant closures by asserting that the proba- 
99. Op. cit. supra n.97, at 143 and 145. 
100. Senator Norris deliberately refused to include provisions recommended by 
Professor Frankfurter and others which would have exempted unions from the anti-trust 
laws. See Kadish, Labor and the Law in FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE (Mendelsohn, editor, 
1964) p. 171-2. 
101. Op. cit. supra n.97, at 215. 
102. See H. Conf. Rep. No. 510, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1947); 1 NLRB 
Leg. Hist. of Lab. Manag. Rel. Act 569 (1947). 
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bilities of employers closing "are surely too remote to be considered 
dangers at which labor statutes aimed";103 and further asserted that the 
danger of employers using threats was not of "sufficient significance" to 
justify restricting their prerogatives. Finally, in the Lockout Cases the 
Court bluntly repudiated any reliance on the Board. The Court not 
only substituted its own judgment in the particular case, but also 
declared: 
Of course, due deference is to be rendered to agency determina- 
tions of fact, so long as there is substantial evidence to be found in 
the record as a whole. But where, as here, the review is not of a 
question of fact, but of a judgment as to the proper balance to be 
struck between conflicting interests, "the deference owed to an 
expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into judicial inertia 
which results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of 
major policy decisions properly made by Congress."1104 
As Mr. Justice White underscores, the Court now treats as mere lip 
service the declarations in Buffalo Linen and Erie Resistor that the 
Board has primary responsibility in the "delicate task . . . of weighing 
the interests." The Board is relegated to a mere fact finder, not compe- 
tent to give the Court guidance in resolving the difficult issues of policy. 
The Court's lack of confidence in the Board may explain, at least in 
part, its decisions in the Anti-Trust Cases. The Court's obvious alterna- 
tive to continued involvement was to find that the problems are now 
regulated by the National Labor Relations Act and that primary juris- 
diction is in the Board. But a Court which two months before would 
give no deference to the Board's weighing of interests under its own 
statute could not seriously consider entrusting the Board with working 
out an accommodation between that statute and the anti-trust laws. 
Why has the Court seemingly lost confidence in the Board? The 
reasons are undoubtedly complex and too deep to be probed here, but 
the cases this year suggest some cause for judicial distrust. Fibreboard 
alone was enough to cause the Court to cast a jaundiced eye on the 
Board's expertise. The Board had first firmly declared that in its judg- 
ment the decision to subcontract in this case was not a mandatory 
subject.105 After a change of administration had changed the member- 
ship of the Board, the case was reconsidered and the new Board with 
equal firmness found that it was a mandatory subject.106 It would in- 
deed have been awkward for the Court to give deference to such ex- 
103. 380 U.S. 263, 272 (1965). 
104. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 292 (1965) 
105. 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 1561 (1961). 
106. 138 N.L.R.B. 550-51 (1962). 
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pertise. The Court could not help knowing that other cases-cases 
which raised substantial issues of policy on which the Court might want 
and need guidance-had been similarly reversed by a hair-breadth na- 
tional election.107 Nor was this a new condition, for in 1952 also an elec- 
tion brought changes in Board membership and changes in the law.108 
Among those changes, as the Court knew, was a change in the Board's 
decisions on lockouts.109 Judgment which bends with the political winds 
cannot command much confidence in the Court, nor are claims of in- 
dustrial experience and expertise under such circumstances given full 
faith and credit. 
Another factor which makes the Court unwilling, if not unable, to 
look to the Board for guidance is that the Board in its opinions seeks too 
seldom to illuminate and too often to obscure. The rank example is 
NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.110 where the Board's deter- 
mination of appropriate units for insurance agents was challenged on 
the grounds that the units were based solely on the extent of organiza- 
tion in violation of Section 9(c)(5). The Board gave no reason for its 
decision other than the citation of certain other insurance agents cases 
which were not directly relevant and omitted citation of other cases 
which seemed contrary. The Board's opinion was so confusing and 
inadequate that the Court was unable to review and was forced to 
remand the case to the Board. The problem was critical in many service 
industries with spotty organization. The Board was apparently parcel- 
ling units so as to permit those who sought representation to have col- 
lective bargaining but not expanding units so as to encompass groups 
who did not seek representation. It was thus providing both the en- 
couragement of collective bargaining and the maximum freedom of 
107. See, for example, International Hod Carriers, Local 840 (Blinne Construction), 
130 N.L.R.B. 587 (1961), opinion withdrawn and new opinion substituted, 135 N.L.R.B. 
1153 (1962); Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union (Crown Cafeteria), 130 N.L.R.B. 570 
(1961), reconsidered and dissenting opinion in preceding case adopted as majority opinion 
135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962). 
108. See, for example, Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493 (1954), Livingstone 
Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1954); Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 
837 (1954). 
109. The "Old Board's" decision in Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1952) 
was reversed by the Court of Appeals in Leonard v. NRLB, 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953). 
The "Eisenhower Board" declined to petition for certiorari, the Chairman stating that 
the Board thought there was nothing unlawful in the employer's conduct. 33 L.R.R.M. 
100. The Board's wavering body of law came before the Court in the Buffalo Linen case, 
353 U.S. 87 (1953). The Court recalled these Board changes in American Ship Building, 
380 U.S. at 307, n.7. 
110. 380 U.S. 438 (1965). 
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choice by the individual-thereby effectuating two fundamental statu- 
tory policies. But however good its reasons, they could not be known, 
much less given weight by the Court. This example is extreme but in- 
dicative. The Fibreboard111 opinions contained no exploration of the 
purpose of the duty to bargain, no study of bargaining practices, and no 
helpful projection of where proposed solutions might lead. It was a 
battle of Board and Court precedents as if the issue were one of con- 
sistency with past poorly considered decisions rather than one of de- 
signing solutions to fit an evolving bargaining structure. Similarly, the 
Darlington"12 opinions say nothing of the potential dangers of plant 
closings or of threats made during the election campaign. From all the 
Board says, these may be insubstantial matters, for the opinions again 
devote themselves to parsing of precedents. Why should the Court look 
to the Board for guidance? Each of the justices have two law clerks who 
can read the cases perhaps even better than the Board. 
The picture drawn from the major labor law decisions this year is one 
of the Supreme Court as the chief lawgiver. This is, of course, a 
caricature, for the bulk of the cases, even in labor law, raise at best 
subordinate questions of policy, and their decision is guided if not 
governed by articulate Congressional policies or understandable statu- 
tory words. But the picture, as a caricature, emphasizes certain features 
of our lawmaking process. On certain problems which reach close to 
the core of our national labor policy, Congress has failed or refused to 
act; Congress has simply not resolved basic issues of policy. The number 
of these is greater than the complexity of our statutes might suggest, for 
as the Clayton Act teaches, the absence of decision is often hidden by the 
plethora of words. Though we have a Board which is created to bring 
experience, judgment, expertness and institutional resources to bear 
on these problems and to serve as an intermediary in evolving solutions, 
it does not serve that function. The responsibility for weighing the 
values and shaping the institutions of collective bargaining comes to 
rest upon the Court. 
The purpose here is not to assess blame. We cannot blame Congress 
for its default without asking why in enacting labor legislation it 
behaves in this fashion. Nor can we blame the Board without probing 
for the forces which have weakened its ability to perform. Nor is the 
Court a wholly innocent victim, for it has seldom protected against its 
power, insisted on Congressional action, or encouraged the Board to 
111. 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961); 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962). 
112. 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962). 
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broaden its considerations. The purpose here is simply to try to make 
plain how our labor law is being made. Underneath is the unproven 
assumption that this is not the way to run a government, and a subtle 
suggestion that it is time for a serious consideration of major changes in 
the administration of our labor lawmaking process. 
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